United States v. Payner--Constriction of the Federal Courts\u27 Supervisory Power by Lewis, Mary Rich
Volume 83 Issue 3 Article 10 
April 1981 
United States v. Payner--Constriction of the Federal Courts' 
Supervisory Power 
Mary Rich Lewis 
West Virginia University College of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr 
 Part of the Courts Commons, and the Evidence Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Mary R. Lewis, United States v. Payner--Constriction of the Federal Courts' Supervisory Power, 83 W. Va. L. 
Rev. (1981). 
Available at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol83/iss3/10 
This Case Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the WVU College of Law at The Research 
Repository @ WVU. It has been accepted for inclusion in West Virginia Law Review by an authorized editor of The 
Research Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact ian.harmon@mail.wvu.edu. 
CASE COMMENTS
UNITED STATES v. PAYNER-CONSTRICTION
OF THE FEDERAL COURTS'
SUPERVISORY POWER
I. THE CASE
United States v. Payner,1 recently decided by the United
States Supreme Court, re-examines and affirms the Court's
earlier holding that a criminal defendant cannot invoke the ex-
clusionary rule by vicariously asserting that a third party's
fourth amendment rights were violated.2 More importantly, the
Court holds that federal trial courts may not use their supervis-
ory powers to suppress evidence in cases wherein the Supreme
Court has previously indicated that the defendant would not
have fourth amendment standing to challenge the admission of
the evidence. 3
The case against Payner arose out of an indictment for
falsification of his federal income tax return. The Government's
case relied heavily upon a loan guarantee agreement in which
Payner pledged his funds in a Bahamas bank as security for a
large loan.' This guarantee agreement was obtained by the Gov-
ernment in a "flagrantly illegal search"' conducted during the
course of an Internal Revenue Service investigation of the finan-
cial activities of American citizens in the Bahamas. Part of this
investigation entailed a federal agent's engaging two private in-
vestigators to cultivate a friendship with Wolstencroft, the
president of the Bahamian Castle Bank. While Wolstencroft was
visiting in Miami and on an arranged "date" with one of the
private investigators, the other investigator entered Wolsten-
croft's apartment and removed his briefcase. During the brief
100 S.Ct. 2439 (1980). Mr. Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court.
2 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978).
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period that followed, the private investigator delivered the
briefcase to the federal agent who supervised the copying of ap-
proximately 400 documents from the briefcase. The investigator
then replaced the briefcase in the apartment. Some of the
documents photographed led federal agents to a Florida bank.
Subpoenas served on the Florida bank ultimately uncovered the
loan guarantee which became the Government's chief evidence
in United States v. Payner6
After finding Payner guilty of the alleged tax fraud, the
district court ruled on the reserved motion to suppress evi-
dence.' The court decided the evidence against Payner "was the
fruit of the outrageously illegal seizure of Wolstencroft's brief-
case."8 The court reasoned that although Payner had no stand-
ing under the fourth amendment to protest the admissibility of
the evidence, the nature of the Government's activities required
that the evidence be excluded under the inherent supervisory
power of the federal courts.' Without the benefit of Payner's
loan guarantee, the Government's case lacked sufficient evi-
dence, and the district court set aside Payner's conviction." The
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's use
of its supervisory power to suppress the aforesaid evidence."
The Supreme Court granted the Government's petition for cer-
tiorari. 2
II. STANDING AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
EXCLUSIONARY RULE
Both the lower court and the higher courts' decisions in
Payner focused on the federal court's supervisory power rather
than Payner's rights under the fourth amendment. Any right of
Payner to complain of a fourth amendment violation was fore-
closed by Rakas v. Illinois," where the Supreme Court ruled
6Id.
'Id. at 2442-43, citing United States v. Payner, 434 F. Supp. 113, 136 (N.D.
Ohio 1977).
6 434 F. Supp. at 133.
100 S.Ct. at 2443-44, citing United States v. Payner, 434 F. Supp. at 129,.
133-35.
10 100 S.Ct. at 2443.
" United States v. Payner, 590 F.2d 206 (6th Cir. 1979).
100 S.Ct. at 2442.
13 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
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that the fourth amendment does not operate to exclude evidence
unless the person claiming the rule's protection has a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the premises searched or in the prop-
erty seized.' Clearly, Payner did not have an interest in
Wolstencroft's papers, briefcase, or hotel room sufficient to
create a legitimate expectation of privacy therein.
The Supreme Court first adopted the exclusionary rule in
1914, ' 5 and immediately thereafter the federal courts began
limiting the use of the rule to those defendants with standing."
The early standing requirement focused on fourth amendment
rights personal to the defendant, thereby necessitating a show-
ing that his own possessory or ownership interests had been in-
vaded. 7 In 1960, in Jones v. United States,8 the Supreme Court
expanded the standing concept by holding that a defendant, or
"person aggrieved," has standing to object to an unreasonable
search and seizure if he is "legitimately on the premises where a
search occurs." 9 In 1967, in Katz v. United States,"0 the Supreme
Court further expanded the standing concept. Prior to Katz,
there could be no fourth amendment violation in the absence of
a physical intrusion into an area wherein the defendant was
legitimately on the premises. Katz recognized that the fourth
amendment protects "people, not places,"'" and therefore the
fourth amendment is applicable to seizures of evidence in which
a defendant has a "legitimate expectation of privacy."" In find-
ing that the evidence seized by tapping the telephone booth
occupied by Katz was illegal, the Court stated that a search is il-
legal if the person aggrieved had an actual subjective expecta-
tion of privacy and if that expectation was objectively reason-
14 Id.
, Weeks v. United Sates, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
" See, e.g., Graham v. United States, 15 F.2d 740 (8th Cir. 1926); Remus v.
United States, 291 F. 501 (6th Cir. 1923); Chicco v. United States, 284 F. 434 (4th
Cir. 1922); Tsuie Shee v. Backus, 243 F. 551 (9th cir. 1917); Moy Wing Sun v. Pren-
tis, 234 F. 24 (7th Cir. 1916).
", See Comment, Rakas v. Illinois: The End of Fourth Amendment Standing
But Not to Fourth Amendment Confusion, 46 BROOKLYN L. REV. 123, 125 n.22
(1979).
,' 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
'9 Id. at 267.
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able.' The "legitimate expectation of privacy" analysis implies
that the court will focus on the person aggrieved and not on the
area searched. 4 For eleven years, the two cases stood side by
side, with both the standard of "legitimately on the premises"
and the standard of "legitimate expectation of privacy" being
applied."
Finally, in Rakas v. Illinois,28 the Supreme Court settled the
issue of standing with regard to persons in positions similar to
Payner. The "legitimately on the premises" test in Jones was re-
jected' and Rakas' request to exclude evidence was denied
because Rakas' own fourth amendment rights had not been vio-
lated. The Rakas Court reiterated the principle that "Fourth
Amendment rights are personal rights which may not be vicar-
iously asserted."28 Further, its decisions adopted the Katz
"legitimate expectation of privacy" analysis. In so doing, the
Court reinterpreted Jones and construed its language
narrowly.' Because a person legitimately on the premises-as a
guest or licensee in a house or apartment-will probably have a
legitimate expectation of privacy, the "legitimacy on the
premises" test used in Jones was swallowed up by the Katz
"legitimate expectation of privacy" standard. As the phrase im-
Comment, Standing to Invoke The Exclusionary Rule Narrowed by New
Use of Privacy Expectation Standard, 64 CORNELL L. REv. 752, 758 (1979).
4 389 U.S. at 353. In Katz, the nature of the telephone booth was not impor-
tant; rather, the Court focused on the expectation of privacy one has when he
shuts behind him the door of that booth.
I See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223 (1973) (the Jones standards
were relied upon); Combs v. United States, 408 U.S. 224 (1972) (the Court followed
the Mancusi-Katz "reasonable expectation of freedom from governmental ifitru-
sion" analysis); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969) (the Jones
"legitimately on the premises" standard was applied); and Mancusi v. De Forte,
392 U.S. 364 (1968) (the Court considered factors from both Jones and Katz).
439 U.S. 128 (1978).
Id. at 133-35.
Id. at 133. The Court cited Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174
(1969) for the above proposition. In Alderman, the Court refused to suppress
evidence obtained by Government electronic surveillance, where Alderman
neither participated in the conversation overheard nor had any interest in the
places surveyed. Id. at 168. The Court stated, "No rights of the victim of an il-
legal search are at stake when the evidence is offered against some other party.
The victim can and very probably will object for himself when and if it becomes im-
portant for him to do so." Id. at 174.
439 U.S. at 135-39.
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plied, "legitimate expectation of privacy" is an objective stan-
dard, not dependent on common-law interests in real or personal
property. However, the possessory or property interests of a
defendant are still relevant factors.
3 0
As a result, when Payner came before the Supreme Court
one term after Rakas, there was no question but that the pres-
ent-day interpretation of the fourth amendment required denial
of Payner's request to exclude evidence seized illegally from
Wolstencroft's apartment and briefcase. If Rakas had no expec-
tation of privacy in the automobile he occupied but did not own,
Payner could not expect the Court to find he had an expectation
of privacy in a hotel room or briefcase he has never even seen.
Despite the original and repeatedly affirmed goals of the exclu-
sionary rule,3 the competing interest of limiting the exclu-
sionary rule so that fewer criminals go free solely because
evidence is tainted32 has prevailed-at least on the issue of
vicarious assertion of fourth amendment rights. For a short
time, it had appeared that the standing concept could be expanded
to protect persons such as Paynerl in order to accomplish the
goals of the exclusionary rule. Rakas eliminates the possibility
of expanding the exclusionary rule to Payner-type situations
" Although footnote 12 in Rakas downplays the need for a "common-law in-
terest in real or personal property," id. at 144 n.12, the Court analyzes Rakas'
property and possessory interest in the automobile searched. Id. at 148. The dis-
sent notes that the Court "effectively ties the application of the Fourth Amend-
ment and the exlusionary rule ... to property law concepts." Id. at 156-57 (White,
J., dissenting). One commentator observed, "Rakas does not return to pre-Jones
distinctions based on property law labels, but it does exalt the possession, control,
and ownership of property." Comment, supra note 23, at 758.
" One purpose and goal of the exclusionary rule is "to deter-to compel
respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effective available way-by
removing the incentive to disregard it." Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217
(1960). See also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). The other purpose is to main-
tain judicial integrity. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 345 (1943).
" See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388,
411 (1971); Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 136 (1954). In Stone v. Powell, 428
U.S. 465, 490 (1976), the Court stated, "Application of the rule thus deflects the
truthfinding process and often frees the guilty."
m Although such a broadening of "standing" might have been possible, the
Alderman holding, discussed in note 28 supra, would have been a formidable
obstacle. The prohibition against vicarious assertion of fourth amendment rights
has been frequently stated. See, e.g., Brown v. United Sates, 411 U.S. 223, 230
(1973); Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 389 (1968).
1981]
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where evidence against a defendant was seized through "pur-
posefully illegal conduct" in an "intentional, bad faith act of
hostility."' The strict requirements of the "legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy" standard frustrate the purpose of the exclu-
sionary rule and will fail to deter Government officials' acts such
as those in Payner.
III. THE SUPERVISORY POWERS ARE CONSTRICTED
The attempted and thwarted use of the federal courts'
supervisory powers in Payner to suppress evidence seized by
the use of an unreasonable search and seizure must be discussed
in light of the historic use of the supervisory powers.
The supervisory powers are the federal appellate courts'
ability to decide the proceedings before them and to review the
decisions of the lower courts in their own system. 5 For example,
one aspect 8 of the authority is the courts' ability to issue law or to
create principles judicially, as opposed to that law created by
statute or the principles explicit in the Federal Constitution.
Specifically, the Supreme Court has used its supervisory power
to create rules of evidence, the most notable of which is the ex-
clusionary rule.37
As the exlusionary rule has developed, whether in the area
of search and seizure or involuntary confessions, the Court has
repeatedly discussed the purposes of and restraints on the
supervisory powers interchangeably with the same purposes of
and restraints on the exclusionary rule.' Dicta in McNabb v.
u 434 F. Supp. at 135.
Schrock & Welsh, Up from Calandra. The Exclusionary Rule as A Con-
stitutional Requirement, 59 MINN. L. REV. 251, 271 n.65 (1974).
" Other aspects are noted in Hill, The Bill of Rights and the Supervisory
Power, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 181, 193 (1969).
The principles governing the admissibility of evidence in federal
criminal trials have not been restricted ... to those derived solely from
the Constitution. In the exercise of its supervisory authority over the
administration of criminal justice in the federal courts ... this Court
has ... formulated rules of evidence to be applied in federal criminal
prosecutions.
McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 341 (1943), citing Nardone v. United
States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
N The purposes of the exclusionary rule and the uses of the supervisory
[Vol. 83
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United States,9 stated that, "[jiudicial supervison ... implies
the duty of establishing and maintaining civilized standards of
procedure and evidence."'" In addition, McNabb stated that the
courts should invoke their supervisory powers to suppress evi-
dence because "a conviction resting on evidence [illegally seized
would make] the courts themselves accomplices in willful disobe-
dience of the law."" Furthermore, the fears created by the ex-
clusionary rule 2 have been soothed to some extent by dicta call-
ing for a limited application of the supervisory power,4 3 which
also demonstrates the interchangeability of the two concepts.
Until 1961, the supervisory power was the only means of im-
plementing the fourth amendment exclusionary rule because, al-
though the rule was based on the fourth amendment, it was not
considered to be a requirement of the fourth amendment." Upon
the "somewhat inexplicit language"' 5 of Weeks v. United
States,6 the Court proceeded for thirty-five years to implement
the exclusionary rule without clarifying the rule's origin.'7 Final-
powers are to deter illegal police conduct, see note 31 supra; to maintain judicial
integrity, see accompanying text at notes 39-41 infra.
318 U.S. 332 (1943).
"0 Id. at 340.
41 Id. at 345. This dicta has been frequently cited. See Elkins v. United
States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960); Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957);
Mesarosh v. United States, 352 U.S. 1 (1956); Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S.
410 (1948).
42 See text accompanying note 32 supra.
"[Tihe application of the rule has been restricted to those areas where its
remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served." United States v.
Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974). See also Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S.
484, 495 (1976); Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214, 216-17 (1956); Elkins v. United
States, 364 U.S. 206, 223 (1960).
" Wolf, A Survey of the Expanded Exclusionary Rule, 32 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 193 (1964).
0 Id. at 195. That language read:
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in
evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the
Fourth Amendment declaring his right to be secure against such
searches and seizures is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are
concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution." Weeks v.
United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914).
" 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
" The Court avoided the issue in 1943, in McNabb, saying it was un-
necessary to decide if the exclusion was constitutionally required, and excluded
evidence through its supervisory powers. 318 U.S. at 340.
1981]
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ly, in Wolf v. Colorado,48 the Court held that the exclusionary rule
was not a constitutional requirement, but only a federal judicial
decision or policy. 9
Thus, for the next twelve years, the federal courts contin-
ued to suppress evidence seized in the course of unreasonable
searches and seizures by virtue of the courts' supervisory pow-
ers.' The exclusionary rule, thus imposed, offered federal
criminal defendants greater rights and protections than those
deemed by the Supreme Court to be guaranteed by the United
States Constitution."' The supervisory powers were a means for
the courts to provide more rights than the Constitution was pre-
sumed to provide and, further, led the way for the Court's even-
tual change.
In 1961, Wolf was overruled by Mapp v. Ohio.2 In holding
that the exclusionary rule must be applied in state criminal ac-
tions, the Court ruled that the exclusionary rule was a require-
ment of the Constitution.' Mapp meant that the Federal Consti-
tution finally offered as much protection as the supervisory
338 U.S. 25 (1949).
Id. at 27-28. "Later cases, particularly Wolf, indicated that the exclu-
sionary rule was a judicially made rule of evidence not required by the Constitu-
tion." Wolf, supra note 44, at 195, and see generally, 195-99. See also Comment, 84
A.L.R.2d 959. It was necessary for the Court in Wolf to find that the rule was
judicially created and not a constitutional requirement, because if the rule was
part of the Constitution, the fourteenth amendment would apply the rule to the
states along with the fourth amendment. "[T]he Court's hesitancy in requiring
that the states adopt the exclusionary rule could be said to show a traditional
sense of judicial conservatism and a respect for the role of the states in our
federal system." Wolf, supra note 44, at 201.
50 See, e.g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961); Elkins v. United States, 364
U.S. 206 (1960); Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957); Rea v. United
States, 350 U.S. 214 (1956); Mesarosh v. United States, 352 U.S. 1 (1956); Stefaneli
v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117 (1951).
" "The unique contribution of the supervisory power doctrine ... is that it
enables the Court to raise the standards of fairness in the administration of
federal justice in advance of the relatively slow pace acceptable in the constitu-
tional area." Note, The Supervisory Power of the Federal Courts, 76 HARV. L.
REV. 1656, 1666-67 (1963).
u 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
" Id. at 660. In Mapp, the Court stated:
Having once recognized that the rights to privacy embodied in the
Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the States and that the right
to be secure against rude invasions of privacy by state officers is,
[Vol. 83
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powers and that the federal courts could thereafter abandon
their supervisory powers and simply apply the exclusionary rule
as a requirement of the Constitution.'
During the years between Mapp and the beginning of the
Burger Court, the Warren Court continued to expand the con-
stitutional rights and protections of criminal defendants. After
1969 the Burger Court began a pattern of constricting these
rights.5 In the face of that constriction, defendant Payner found
himself before the Court with no constitutional grounds on
which to suppress evidence seized in bad faith hostility to the
Constitution. The Rakas rule that fourth amendment rights can-
not be vicariously asserted foreclosed Payner's fourth amend-
ment challenge. Innovatively, perhaps, the district court
employed its federal supervisory power to accomplish its tradi-
tional goals,"0 and attempted once again to expand the rights and
protections afforded to criminal defendants further than provided
therefore, constitutional in origin, we can no longer permit that right to
remain an empty promise. Id.
Note, however, that this interpretation has been contradicted, albeit inconsistently,
by the Supreme Court. In Mapp, at 648, the Court stated that the "exlusionary
rule has been a requirement of the Constitution since 1914," but later held in
1974, that the exclusionary rule was "judicially created.., rather than a personal
constitutional right .... United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974). The
inconsistency is discussed in great detail in Schrock & Welsh, supra note 35. The
authors state that:
For Justice Day [in Weeks] ... the rule was not 'an enforcement tool,'
but was itself a 'Fourth Amendment guarantee: Or, to put it another
way, the rule does not 'give content and meaning to the Fourth Amend-
ment guarantees as Brennan [in Calandra] says; it is part of that mean-
ing. . . . In short, Day's is a constitutional right holding, whereas
Brandeis and Holmes made a supervisory power argument' Id. at 288.
See also Monaghan, The Supreme Court 1974 Term, Forward. Constitutional
Common Law, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1, 3-10, 40 (1975).
" Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 33 (1963).
1 Seidman, Factual Guilt and the Burger Court: An Examination of Con-
tinuity and Change in Criminal Procedure, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 436 (1980). The con-
striction has been so thorough that the foremost proponents of the theory that
the exlusionary rule is a constitutional requirement have found that the constitu-
tional requirement-judicial rule argument is resolved. They recognize that "[w]hat
was early understood as a rule expressing an exclusionary right is now
understood not as a personal constitutional right but rather as a judicially created
remedy." Schrock & Welsh, Reconsidering The Constitutional Common Law, 91
HARV. L. REV. 1117 (1978).
1 See note 38 supra.
1981]
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under the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Constitution.
The difference, of course, was that the district court expanded a
defendant's rights after the Supreme Court had restricted them,
where always before the supervisory powers had expanded
rights not yet addressed. The Supreme Court based its reason-
ing upon this difference. The Court rejected the district court's
use of the supervisory powers, saying the use is improper where
the Court has already spoken.5 The decision demonstrates that
the Supreme Court is not only presently in an era of constricting
constitutional rights,' but it is also entering an era of constrict-
ing the scope of the federal courts' supervisory powers, at least
within areas where the Supreme Court has previously dictated
controlling law. Constriction of the fourth amendment has been
ensured by Payner's limitation of the federal courts' supervisory
powers.
IV. ANALYSIS AND IMPACT OF THE PAYNER DECISION
Understandably, the Supreme Court has sought to achieve a
steadfast, positive statement on the rights and protections pro-
vided to criminal defendants in federal court. In light of the
many fears expressed during the periods of expanded criminal
protections, many conservatives will view the Supreme Court's
restriction of the exclusionary rule as a positive step toward
achieving more criminal convictions and better protection of
society. Others, however, who have a more sympathetic view
towards persons such as Payner and Wolstencroft, or who have
ideals concerning the meaning of the Federal Constitution that
take priority over the drawbacks of the exclusionary rule, or
who have cynicism toward the zealousness of law enforcement
officers, will view the decision with renewed discouragement.
The ironies in the decision abound, for the Payner decision
states several times in the majority opinion alone that society
has an interest in deterring the bad faith conduct inherent in
many illegal searches and seizures. 9 Yet, the Court concludes
that the need to deter searches such as that conducted of Wol-
stencroft's briefcase does not outweigh the need to acquire suffi-
cient evidence to convict one individual of income tax fraud. The
100 S.Ct. at 2446-47.
See note 55 supra.
100 S.Ct. at 2446 n.8, 2447.
[Vol. 83
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Court seems concerned that the "controlling decisions of this
Court" 0 be paramount and not evaded in any manner, rather
than in any discretionary means of avoiding the undesirable
repercussions of its Rakas decision.
Furthermore, upon noting that principles of the Court de-
nounce lawless activities and exclude evidence obtained in such
activities, the Court states that "they must be weighed against
the considerable harm that would flow from indiscriminate ap-
plication of an exlcusionary rule."'" Ironically, it is discrimina-
tion that is contemplated by the use of the supervisory powers62
and is emphatically rejected by the Payner decision. When the
Court holds that permitting the lower courts to use the super-
visory powers where the Supreme Court has already rule would
"enable the federal courts to exercise a standardless discretion
in their application of the exclusionary rule," the Court closes
the door to any discretion- standardless or not-and any con-
sideration of relevant or even overwhelming social phenomena
or policy. In his dissent to the Rakas decision, Mr. Justice White
commented that the majority's opinion declared 'open season'
on automobiles;"64 after Payner, the Court has gone further and
declared a permanent "open season" on bank officials and any-
one else who might possess information federal officers could
covet.
One must examine the impact that the Supreme Court's
decision in Payner will have on state courts and state criminal
defendants. To be sure, some states will follow the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the fourth amendment with in-kind in-
terpretations of their own state constitutions' search and
seizure provisions. However, the present trend throughout the
country is for state courts to apply their own interpretations of
Id. at 2447.
" Id. at 2445.
"The civilized conduct of criminal trials cannot be confined within
mechanical rules. It necessarily demands the authority of limited direction en-
trusted to the judge presiding in federal trials, including a well-established range
of judicial discretion .... Such a system as ours must, within the limits here in-
dicated, rely on the learning, good sense, fairness and courage of federal trial
judges." Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 342 (1939).
100 S.Ct. at 2445.
439 U.S. at 157 (White, J., dissenting).
1981]
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their own constitutions, thereby affording criminal defendants
more rights and protections under some state constitutions than
under the United States Constitution. 5 This trend, dubbed the
"New Federalism," has been employed largely by state courts
evading federal issues whenever possible and deciding state
issues under their own broader interpretations of their own
state constitutions."8 The Supreme Court of Hawaii, in State v.
Kaluna 7 stated that:
[W]e are of the opinion that as a search and seizure, the conduct
of the police in this case was unreasonable. While this results in
a divergence of meaning between words which are the same in
both the federal and state constitutions, the system of federal-
ism envisaged by the United States Constitution tolerates such
divergence where the result is greater protection of individual
rights under state law than under federal law .... In this
respect, the opinion of the United States Supreme Court on the
meaning of the phrase 'unreasonable searches and seizures' is
merely another source of authority admittedly to be afforded
respectful consideration, but which we are free to accept or re-
ject in establishing the outer limits of protection afforded by
article I, section 5 of the Hawaii Constitution.
Furthermore, the Pennsylvania court has actually excluded
evidence obtained in an unlawful search and seizure of a defend-
ant's bank records under the Pennsylvania state constitution, 8
flatly refusing to follow United States v. Miller,9 wherein such
evidence was deemed not excludable under the Federal Con-
stitution.
7 1
' Wilkes, More on the New Federalism in Criminal Procedure, 63 KY. L.J.
873 (1975).
Id. See also Wilkes, The New Federalism in Criminal Procedure: State
Court Evasion of the Burger Court, 62 Ky. L.J. 421 (1974).
67 520 P.2d 51, 58 n.6 (Hawaii 1974).
Commonwealth v. DeJohn, 403 A.2d 1283 (Pa. 1979).
" United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976). The Supreme Court held that
the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution did not protect a defen-
dant from the admission of evidence secured in the seizure of bank deposit slips
and checks, because there is no legitimate expectation of privacy concerning such
information.
o The Pennsylvania court held, "As we believe that Miller establishes a
dangerous precedent, with great potential for abuse, we decline to follow that
case when construing the state constitutional protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures." 403 A.2d at 1289.
[Vol. 83
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Unlike the Pennsylvania court, the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals has not yet chosen to interpret its own con-
stitution rather than the Federal Constitution in a case involv-
ing a "legitimate expectation of privacy." However, there is
every reason to believe that such interpretation is imminent, for
the West Virginia court has twice expressed that it is "free to
adopt stronger protections under our state constitution than
those afforded by its federal counterpart."'" Justice Miller
believes that the West Virginia court should tie constitutional
guarantees to the West Virginia Constitution whenever possi-
ble. 2 Recognizing that the United States Supreme court has
"pendulate[d] on its interpretation of the Bill of Rights,' 7 3
Justice Miller hopes that the constitutional "rights based on the
West Virginia Constitution will become more permanent."" The
West Virginia court has utilized its freedom to interpret and to
apply the state constitution independently in State ex reL Whit-
man v. Fox, 5 which involved a conspiracy statute and the due
process clause. The West Virginia court, upon opportunity, will
probably make a search and seizure decision independently of
the Federal Constitution's current constrictions.
Thus, some state courts will probably continue to exclude
evidence such as that seized from Wolstencroft's briefcase, on
the grounds that such searches are unreasonable under their re-
spective state constitutions, and on the assumption that such ex-
clusion would constitute a valid policy in discouraging similar il-
legal conduct by other law enforcement officers. The Supreme
Court has stated, however, that the federal courts are stripped
of any power to make similar discretionary judgments.
" State v. Canby, 252 S.E.2d 164, 167 n.2 (W. Va. 1979). Canby involves the
test of exigent circumstances for the making of an arrest for a felony without a
warrant. See also State ex rel. Dowdy v. Robinson, 257 S.E.2d 167, 172 (W. Va.
1979), which involved the issue of double jeopardy.
" Gooden v. Board of Appeals of W. Va. Dept. of Public Safety, 234 S.E.2d
893, 898 (W. Va. 1979) (Miller, J., concurring).
,1 Id. at 898-99.
74 Id.
71 236 S.E.2d 565 (W. Va. 1979). The court found that a West Virginia con-
spiracy statute was modeled on a similar federal conspiracy statute, and recog-
nized that that federal conspiracy statute had withstood constitutional scrutiny.
Nevertheless, the court insisted on evaluating the West Virginia statute's con-
stitutionality under the state's due process clause. The court stressed West
Virginia's "long constitutional tradition of protecting individual rights:' Id. at 569.
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V. CONCLUSION
The effects of Payner seem very clear. First, the Supreme
Court has affirmed its constriction of the fourth amendment pro-
tections so as to preclude any vicarious assertion of a third par-
ty's rights to be free of unreasonable search and seizure. In so
holding, the Court has defined and restricted the fourth amend-
ment with such precision that no federal court is permitted to
exclude evidence after an independent evaluation under its
supervisory powers. By holding that the supervisory powers
may not be utilized to expand fourth amendment rights where
the Court has previously spoken, the Court has furthered its
policy of restricting fourth amendment protections. The super-
visory powers, long a tool for deterring bad faith searches and
seizures and of preserving judicial integrity, may no longer be
used upon a federal court's discretionary determination that
those ends need to be served. The result is that the supervisory
powers are constricted, the fourth amendment's protection is
limited, and there are no means left by which the federal courts
can deter conduct such as the Government officials displayed in
Payner. The bite into judicial integrity may be irreparable, but
on the other hand the public may feel more confident that fewer
criminals "will go free because the constable has blundered.""0
Second, the Supreme Court has implied that the supervisory
powers may be implemented by lower federal courts in areas
where the Supreme Court has not ruled, but may not be imple-
mented to circumvent the previous decisions of the Court.
Third, the Supreme Court has, whether intentionally or not,
placed responsbility for protecting individual rights on the
states. Although it remains to be seen how many states will ex-
tend the coverage of their own constitutions beyond the cov-
erage of the Federal Constitution, the evolution of the "New
Federalism"" in some states reassures that some state defend-
ants' rights will not be eroded. However, the Supreme Court's
restriction of the fourth amendment and of the supervisory
powers clearly leaves those persons accused of federal crimes
unprotected.
People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926).
See notes 65-66 and accompanying text supra.
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Finally, the only possible relief for a future federal criminal
defendant in Payner's shoes is a Congressional statute nullifying
the effect of Payner. In the face of the unlikelihood of such an
enactment, and in the face of the finality of Payner and Rakas,
defendants can only rely on the potential protections of state
courts interpreting their own state constitutions.
Mary Rich Lewis
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